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CAN SANDEL DETHRONE MERITOCRACY?

Comment on M. Sandel's The Tyranny of Merit
Robert L. Tsai*

In the past, Michael Sandel has inveighed against modes of debate that bracket moral
questions and has exhorted Americans to discuss controversial issues in openly ethical
terms, without telling us whose moral conception should prevail. His inviting and probing
style, coupled with his insistence that you couldn't have a just society without being judgmental, has made him an academic sensation.' The title of his new book, The Tyranny of
Merit: What's Become of the Common Good?,2 disparages merit, but it is coy about whether
the idea is problematic in the abstract or in practice. About halfway through the book, I
began to feel that he had finally slipped off the fence on the question under consideration.
Merit is not a laudable concept that should be saved. As the pace of the book quickens, so
Sandel becomes more urgent in trying to persuade us there is something intrinsically
corrosive about the idea itself.
Sandel contends that a meritocratic manner of approaching the important things in
life is objectionable for two reasons. First, it may actually lock in inequality rather than
ameliorate it by layering a sense of unjustified desert on top of existing inequities. Second,
obsession with merit fosters "hubris" among society's winners and "humiliates" the losers
through a series of ultracompetitive social experiences.
Sandel is at his best when he painstakingly unpacks the idea of merit into its component parts, illuminating both its appeal and why its "logic is corrosive of commonality." 3
He also fruitfully shows how philosophy has accommodated the rise of meritocracy by

Author: *Robert L. Tsai is a Professor of Law and Law Alumni Scholar, Boston University School of Law. Professor Tsai
thanks Martha Minow, Randall Kennedy, and Cass Sunstein for the opportunity to reflect on Michael Sandel's latest
contribution. He also appreciates the close read from research assistants Victoria Abramchuck and Ali Wainwright.
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valorizing higher education, which he says has worsened credentialism and paved the way
for governance by technocrats. He argues, for instance, that Hayekian economic libertarianism and Rawls-inspired social welfare liberalism tiptoe around the myth of merit, although both "reject the idea that economic rewards should reflect what people deserve"
and both deny that principles of justice should reward merit.4 Despite laudable beginnings,
meritocratic attitudes "are not necessarily softened or displaced" by either philosophy.'
I applaud Sandel's success in demonstrating that the ideology of merit has metastasized
into a serious obstacle to equality, although Sandel himself does not speak in quite this
way, preferring instead the discourse of ethics that is a staple of moral philosophy. Ideology may be a superior method of conceiving of the dilemma, however, because meritocracy is a belief system sustained by "pull yourself up by your bootstraps" mythology, waves
of immigration built on the American Dream, and many institutions that reward educational attainment and credentialism.
If we make this turn, we will realize that it's not merely a matter of selecting a better
way of talking about a social issue and avoiding less ideal ones, but instead is a problem
that requires reprogramming interlocking systems of thought and fostering alternative
ways of life. Instead of a single ethic that's the culprit, the problem reveals itself to be
an entire network of complicated and nested values, institutions, norms, policies, and
habits.6 Ideologies can inspire people to commit to grand visions, but they can also block
productive forms of solidarity by leading people to act against their own self-interest.
Treating meritocracy as an ideology rather than an ethic also teaches that it's never
enough to offer stand-alone solutions; reform must come in packages. Even the way we
approach politics can't be reduced to a global moral discourse; instead, we make more
progress by showing facility with a suite of discourses. Another valuable lesson is that
there will surely be unintended consequences. Tugging on one part of the social fabric
may make the area where we've momentarily trained our eyes more beautiful, but it could
also rip open seams in other, neglected sections of the tapestry. Sometimes it's worth
pressing on despite the risk of introducing imperfections; at other times, change won't
be worth the candle.
With these thoughts in mind-that meritocracy is a tenacious ideology, that meaningful change comes not from persuasion but something closer to conversion, and that
reformers must be on guard for unintended effects of laudable proposals-I take up Sandel's
more specific arguments. First, I reveal the underlying tensions in Sandel's logic, which
accords primary moral value to the form of politics over outcomes and to status over
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materiality. Given the complex culture of meritocracy, I question whether its excesses can
be curbed, or gross inequality reduced, with an approach that fails to emphasize material
outcomes.

Second, I assess Sandel's proposal to reform university admissions by introducing a
lottery system. Because the proposal could be realistically implemented only at a handful
of highly selective institutions, its impact on meritocratic faith or tangible inequality is
likely to be modest. Worse, randomizing distribution may cause a backlash among communities that have (over)invested in the means to compete for scarce slots at elite institutions,
which would undermine Sandel's objectives.
Third, although Sandel rightly observes that meritocracy is contributing to the politics
of resentment roiling our country, his approach to emotions in politics is incomplete, for it
focuses too narrowly on white grievances in a single election. Instead, we need to get better
at evaluating historical claims of anger and disillusionment from multiple communities
across time.

I conclude by suggesting that Trumpism wasn't a coherent attack on meritocracy,
but one that tried to harness resentment so as to introduce meritocratic logic into
new domains, such as immigration and refugee policy. If we want to reduce meritocracy's
dominance in particular social domains, we must offer a potent substitute that can bring
elites and ordinary citizens together. When it comes to university admissions or border
control, where the politics are fraught and issues sensitive, that alternative may be the
rhetoric of fairness.
I.

TWO DISTINCTIONS: FORM VERSUS OUTCOMES, MATERIALITY VERSUS EMOTIONS

There are two basic tensions that course like lightning throughout The Tyranny of Merit:
What's Become of the Common Good? The first arises from Sandel's general philosophical
orientation and manifests as a difference between the terms of political debate and actual
outcomes, with the author characteristically choosing to imbue the former with primary
moral significance, and the latter with only occasional, or secondary, moral significance.
This strategy stems from Sandel's telos-based methodology to resolving matters of distributive justice.
The other tension is found in Sandel's more specific criticism of merit: between the
unequal material conditions he acknowledges (with respect to income, access to resources,
diminished social mobility) and the status-based consequences of a meritocratic ethic with
which he is especially troubled (the marking of some individuals, and at times whole
groups, as deserving and others as undeserving). Most of the time, he does his best not
to choose between these two kinds of injuries. Of course, reaching wise and just decisions
will inevitably require us to make tradeoffs.
If Sandel is correct that how we engage in politics is more critical than the actual
decisions we make, adhering to his insightful approach should lead to the revitalization
72

of our politics. Heeding his advice may also reduce feelings of inferiority and helplessness that plague our society. We could even begin to imagine living together differently.
But if Sandel is wrong, and outcomes matter more than how members of a society talk
about their problems, then he may be focused on symptoms at the expense of causes. And,
if he is wrong to value the emotional harms consistently over material differences, then his
solutions may unwittingly reproduce some of the vices he strives to lessen.
Specifically, meritocracy could be a byproduct of gross inequality rather than one of its
causes. If meritocracy is not the cause of inequality but instead is one of several belief
systems and mindsets that lock-in inequality (along with racism, misogyny, aporophobia),
then getting rid of visible meritocratic practices could still leave other forms of inequality
in place. Worse, attacking certain policies labeled "meritocratic" could waste precious time
and resources and actually trigger more resentment that fuels policies, setting back some
groups even further.
What sustains notions of opportunity and competition that can themselves be corrupted into an unhealthy meritocratic sensibility? The market, for one. It's not an institution but an organized practice of economic exchange and planning for prosperity. Yet
when the basic economic structure of a polity underwrites unhealthy ways that human
beings relate to one another, then the problematic features must become the focus of
reform. Although Sandel is not opposed to major structural changes, he doesn't propose
any either. That silence suggests he would find it acceptable if capital and labor remain
in existing alignments, along with unequal power relations, as long as discussions continue apace in transparently ethical terms.'
This may be why he has comparatively more to say about the benefits of rhetorically
emphasizing "the dignity of work" than he does about the specific policies that might
transform the nature of work in a time of rapid technological and cultural change. This
advice will strike few as objectionable, given that a number of prominent politicians on both
sides of the aisle (including Democrat Senator Sherrod Brown and Republican Senator
Marco Rubio) have in recent years extolled the "dignity of labor." And now, President
Biden, whose life personifies the idea, has made it the centerpiece of his administration.'
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It is possible that Sandel is not as concerned with questions of material inequality
because he thinks that it is not fruitful to engage them at the appropriate level of moral
probity without first clearing away the detritus of merit. That would make the absence of
sustained focus on materiality merely a matter of practical calculation rather than moral
priority.
Still, at times, Sandel writes as if the form of our politics is logically prior to and more
vital than the policies we settle upon. He also treats emotional harms that flow from the
way we engage in public discourse as equivalent to material deprivations. For instance,
Sandel says that "proposals to compensate for inequality by increasing the purchasing
power of working- and middle-class families, or to shore up the safety net, will do little
to address the anger and resentment that now run deep. This is because the anger is about
the loss of recognition and esteem."'
Sandel's insistence that there is a moral imperative to anticipate emotional harms that
flow from political debate itself highlights another difficulty: how to weigh claims of social
insult and determine appropriate responses. If we were to go down this road, we would
have to become more skillful at judging among assertions of status-based injury. First,
questions related to social status are inherently more malleable and vexing compared with
decisions involving the allocation of social goods. We would have to come up with ways of
distinguishing status-based harms that matter from those that don't raise questions of
justice, without inhibiting robust debate.
Second, a certain degree of social conflict and status anxiety are natural byproducts of
the search for justice. After all, equality is a liberationist idea whose potency even its own
proponents cannot contain completely. Whether we consult the emancipatory lessons in
our religious traditions or America's own fitful history of egalitarian progress, we discover
that lifting some people up will cause others who had previously enjoyed a more prominent
seat at the table and a larger slice of the pie to experience anger and demand satisfaction.
This means that we will be awash in genuine grievances about loss of dignity and status, as well as less significant, although heartfelt, complaints that accompany just forms of
equalization. Sandel seemingly treats secondary harms flowing from the nature of our discourse as equivalent to the primary material- and status-based harms caused by actual
policies.
But that would be a mistake. The first kind of claim might lead us to alter our proposals
or change how we talk to fellow citizens; the latter might not warrant any recognition at all or
warrant only a minor accommodation. We can't be deterred from making hard decisions
for fear it will upset those invested in the status quo. After all, there will always be people
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who prefer that their perceived enemies wallow in the same misery that they are trapped
by, rather than imagine how changed circumstances can increase opportunities and improve
status for all.
II.

WILL REFORMING ELITE INSTITUTIONS REDUCE MERITOCRACY'S GRIP
ON AMERICAN LIFE?

Sandel singles out the university for sustained discussion in chapter 6 of his book. One
might ask why he neglects other institutions that promote "the rhetoric of rising"" and
perpetuate the logic of sorting (e.g., the media, political parties, and most high schools),
but let us leave such missed opportunities to one side. There is ample justification for
rethinking the role of the university, given its central place in the master narrative of
American success. Sandel reserves his greatest scorn for the admissions process, which
he vividly describes as a giant sorting machine, because the university has wrongly internalized the idea that sifting human beings from one another is its central goal rather than
expanding access to education.
Sandel proposes using standardized tests and grades only to cull out those who truly
would not make it in a given institution and then employing a lottery to decide who
among the qualified get a seat in the incoming class. There is much to recommend this
plan, for Sandel is correct that institutionalizing an element of chance can signal merit's
limits and help break up concentrated patterns of wealth and heredity.
On the other hand, this might work only at the handful of most selective universities
and colleges. And if that is the case, manipulating admissions policies will have only a
limited effect in reshaping meritocratic beliefs.
Randomness has a way of undermining organizational function unless the inputs are
virtually indistinguishable and variations in outcomes can be overcome. Winding up
with very few students interested in the sciences or too many who want to play quarterback one year might be balanced by better lottery outcomes in subsequent years. A
large, rich institution can ride out extreme variability. Less wealthy or smaller colleges,
particularly those that rely on a handful of specialized programs or athletics to keep the
lights on, will have a harder time weathering the chaotic forces unleashed by Sandel's
proposal.
As to restoring a sense of esteem among meritocracy's losers, I have doubts whether
modifying admissions policies at Harvard or Yale will reduce the heavy investments by
meritocrats in trying to win admission to selective schools or reduce a sense of skepticism
and exclusion on the part of those who don't already value higher education. Nor would
doing so likely instill a stronger belief in the common good among recent immigrants
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and upper-middle-class families, who are among the most vocal defenders of individualism and academic achievement. In fact, making admissions even more of a crapshoot
than it already is could very well have the opposite effect, by promoting resentment
among those who see entrance to a selective university as integral to the American
Dream.

The outsize sacrifices made in the quest for prestige is unquestionably unhealthy, but
tackling university admissions head-on, rather than other priorities, is sure to produce a
tricky form of backlash politics. That said, even a modest shift in patterns of those who get
into the top range of selective schools could be reason enough to give it a try, despite
uncertainty in how it would affect feelings of status. The proposal might expand material
outcomes for those who get shuffled upward, even if it does little to convince them of the
downside of praise-seeking as a way of life.
The realization that some disharmony is inevitable is even more apparent when we
ponder further that Sandel's critique of merit-that it is an elitist concept-gives short
shrift to a populist perspective on merit. Popular defenders of merit don't necessarily have
a problem with the most talented people having more influence in society, whether it is in
industry, sport, or politics. They don't wish to dethrone excellence, although they differ
from technocrats about what excellence means. But they are suspicious of elites who
would cynically take advantage of their anger at the vagaries of life to present superficial
changes; many would also oppose broad reforms that radically alter the nature of institutions they cherish.
For a populist meritocrat, the answer to the calcification of social mobility isn't to
introduce luck into the calculus and thereby destroy incentives to improve oneself, or
to water down the standards of institutions so as to call their quality into doubt. Rather,
the solution is to offer subsidies to those who don't start out with as many advantages and
to increase investments in schools and experiences that might set people up for a better
shot at selective opportunities.
III.

RECENT ELECTIONS VS. DEEPER TRENDS: REDUCING UNDESIRABLE EMOTIONS
ON THE WAY TO DOING JUSTICE

Sandel's warning that meritocracy can fuel a politics of recrimination that undermines
egalitarian projects when it has "hardened into a hereditary aristocracy" 2 should be taken
seriously. Promising, too, is a stronger turn in his work toward integrating the study of
the senses with his long-standing approach to moral philosophy. Indeed, both parts of
this thesis deserve more attention than he gives them. Focusing on white resentment,
without bringing into the picture emotions such as despondency and anger on the part
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of perennially disfavored social groups, presents an incomplete portrait of what justice
requires when there are competing complaints of deprivation and insult. 3
Part of the difficulty may be Sandel's preoccupation with a single election rather than
the trajectory of politics over time, which has long been characterized by cycles of egalitarian gain and resentful regression. He seems genuinely shaken by the 2016 election, and
the book is shaped by his efforts to puzzle its meaning-principally for white Americans.
But was it really a revolt against meritocracy as he suggests?
Trumpism was a popular reaction to many things, such as globalization and the enhanced influence of racial minorities over public affairs, 4 but it was never a concerted
effort to dismantle rule by the talented. Although he was skillful at stoking a sense of grievance, Trump was never all that interested in policies that might actually disrupt the means
by which elites of one generation pass on their advantages to the next generation. Moreover, although he often displayed contempt for and suspicion of experts, his actual
approach to governing toggled between an appreciation of meritocratic signifiers, like
fancy degrees, and an aristocratic reliance on the counsel of close family members and
friends, rather than modeling an alternative to rule by the talented. His anti-elitism was
usually more aesthetic than substantive.
If Trumpism represented a collective statement about meritocracy at all, one of its
achievements may have been to extend the mindset into new contexts, such as immigration and refugee policy. On these signature issues, the President's rhetoric consisted of
not only demonizing foreign countries and noncitizens but also promising to inject the
question of moral worth into deciding who may enter the country.
As Sandel himself acknowledges in discussing the work of Arlie Russell Hochschild, 5
white Americans have directed much of their resentment toward perceived "line cutters":
foreigners and racial minorities, some of whom could use some extra help from the government through social welfare programs. Sandel largely takes these complaints at face
value, rather than trying to separate legitimate grievances from a desire for payback. That's
a shame, because there are righteous forms of anger and selfish ones, just as there is bitterness worth assuaging and envy of neighbors that should not be countenanced. Not all
resentment is alike.
What's also fascinating, though, is that Trump saw discontent as an opportunity to
expand the rhetoric of merit into new domains. He did so by advancing wide-ranging

13

PANKAJ MISHRA, AGE OF ANGER:

(2019);

MARTHA

C.

NUSSBAUM,

THE PASSIONS OF LAW

14

A

HISTORY OF THE PRESENT

(2017);

MARTHA MINOW, WHEN SHOULD LAW FORGIVE?

ANGER AND FORGIVENESS: RESENTMENT, GENEROSITY, JUSTICE

SUSAN

A.

BANDES,

(2000).

(2019);
(2011).

JENNIFER M. SILVA, WERE STILL HERE: PAIN AND POLITICS IN THE HEART OF AMERICA
PERSISTENCE OF THE COLOR LINE: RACIAL POLITICS AND THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY

15

(2016);

RANDALL KENNEDY, THE

ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN RIGHT

(2016).
77

changes to immigration and refugee policy as part of a "merit-based, high security plan."
In fact, he singled out the high number of legal immigrants who "come here on the basis of
random chance," and pronounced that "[r]andom selection is contrary to American values
and blocks out many qualified potential immigrants from around the world who have
much to contribute." For Trump and his allies, the goal was to "create a clear path for
top talent" and reduce the number of "low-wage and low-skilled" workers who "compete
for jobs against the most vulnerable Americans and put pressure on our social safety
net."16

Turning to merit-speak narrowed the conversation over immigration reform to a single objective: sorting more deserving foreigners into America, and barring the rest, who
are deemed undeserving. In this context, the internal logic of desert fused together notions
of white supremacy, cultural nationalism, and resource scarcity. And it did so by giving
policy makers a superficially pleasing, race-neutral way of pursuing any or all of these
goals.
As this example illustrates, meritocracy is made up of an ideology that can leak into a
variety of social domains, including those far afield from the primary areas of economic
concern. The lesson is that defeating meritocracy can't just be about opening more doors;
it also must be about policing the logic of desert in multiple settings so as to produce
meaningful outcomes.
An alternative approach to Sandel's global antimeritocracy discourse would entail calibrating the way we talk depending on the issue, the domain, and the political climate. It
would also be concerned with facilitating a broad range of emotions, rather than devoted
to the reduction of resentment. The question would become: which social values and emotions should be fostered in a particular domain?
Sandel's objections to merit can thus be recapitulated as a concern that the ideology of
desert has unjustifiably dominated policy in certain domains. But the most effective way of
beating back an undesired kind of discourse may be to replace it with another. What, then,
should replace the corrosive language of merit?
The trouble with the rhetoric of merit has always been that asking who deserves what
turns every question into one about the dues a person has paid and transforms every policy choice into a reflection of the moral worth of the individuals involved. This approach
magnifies the advantages of those who possess more resources to invest.
Yet equality may not be the best fit either. For egalitarians, the language of desert isn't
just inappropriate in many noncriminal contexts; it can also degenerate into pernicious
stereotypes and outright hostility against disfavored groups. Even so, in a pluralistic environment, full-throated equality discourse approaches the apex of its utility when there is
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consensus that a social good at stake is both valuable and should be widely available. By
contrast, it fares less well when noncitizens or access to higher education is involved, for
equality's hard-edged insistence on entitlement can feel out of place. After all, is there
really a right to enter another country? Are the rights of citizenship really implicated
by who gets into a selective school?
The situational factors reducing equality's potency explain why when the rhetoric of
equality clashes with that of merit, merit often wins. And on those occasions when equality prevails over merit, as with affirmative action, a certain amount of resentment is to be
expected.
If the logic of merit must be displaced, but equality is too strident for the task, the best
option might be fairness. Fairness can work well when many stakeholders are resistant to
universalist claims to a particular social good. Substituting the discourse of fairness when
it comes to debating university admissions or immigration policies retains focus on social
purpose, but it may do a better job of beating back meritocracy's excesses. Fair play captures just enough of the meritocrat's belief that individual hard work is good for its own
sake and should be encouraged. At the same time, it could also keep at bay overly wrought
judgments about what kinds of people deserve to get in and which ones don't.
The rhetoric of fairness trains more attention on policies, systems, and communal needs
compared with merit's emphasis on striving individuals (or even equality's focus on entitlements). This is a subtle change, but one that could promote less obsession over cashing out
one's own personal investments to get ahead and greater attention on how a well-ordered
community might give each person a realistic shot at the important things in life.
A wonderful example of this strategy can be found in Teddy Roosevelt's famous 1903
speech that extolled the virtues of the "square deal." "There are good citizens and bad citizens in every class as in every locality,"" he reminded his audience, at another moment of
rising inequality and social tumult in America. Roosevelt inveighed against both "envy and
arrogance"1 8 as traits that are destructive of society. He would later explain that a square
deal represented "an attitude of kindly justice as between man and man, without regard to
what any man's creed or birthplace or social position may be."19
For Roosevelt, the principle of fairness ensured that each individual got an equal shot
at what he needed, and perhaps even deserved, but not at the expense of society. As he
pointed out, "in the long run, we all of us tend to go up or go down together." 20 According to

17

President Theodore Roosevelt, speech at the State Fair, Syracuse, NY (Sept. 7, 1903), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND SPEECHES OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, 1901-1905, at 498 (Alfred Henry Lewis ed., 1906).

18

Id. at 500.

19

Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Paul H. Lacey, (Jan. 16, 1904), https://www.gilderlehrman.org/collection

/glc04078.
20

Supra note 17, at 498.
79

the "community of interest among our people, [t]he welfare of each of us is dependent
fundamentally upon the welfare of all of us." 21 By emphasizing themes of fairness rather
than equality, he shrewdly avoided attacks that he promoted "class hatred" and bridged
differences between the capitalist and the wage-worker, "[m]en sincerely interested in the
due protection of property, and men interested in seeing that the just rights of labor are
guaranteed."22
Although Roosevelt occasionally used the language of moral worth, the concept of
merit was always disciplined by the overarching notion of fairness: "We must see that each
is given a square deal, because he is entitled to no more and should receive no less." 23 In
how Roosevelt deployed the logic of fairness, there is room both to preserve opportunity
and to offer aid to those who need it to get to the starting line.
My point isn't that fairness is a global solution. Rather, the challenge for meritocracy's
critics is to provide an alternative belief system that's sufficiently rousing that it can bring
together outcasts and insiders, people who are struggling and those who are doing just fine
under the existing rules. Meritocracy's defenders can be found in every social class. Loosening the ideology's grip on the public imagination will require clarion calls at times, but
also quiet conversations. Or else meritocrats will not become converts to a new way of life,
but rather the faith's bishops and foot soldiers for the next generation.
If this insight is correct, the sort of facility with a multiplicity of discourses sketched
here-a kind of code-switching based on issue, domain, and social plausibility-represents
the direction in which we must head. It may not prove to be fully satisfying to Sandel, who,
above all, prefers that citizens debate matters with moral clarity. But constant, rollicking
discussions conducted in the same moral register can exhaust participants, inure them to
the suffering of others, and make them less open to legitimate grievances. It's possible that
a layered approach to inequality can lead to more progress on multiple fronts, with fewer
setbacks. And that's something to celebrate in a society that aspires to justice.
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